Release Artifact Signing Assessment

Decision: Deferred

Assessed: 2026-11-12, against releases v0.1.0-alpha.1 through v1.0.1 (#129).

Revisit: when any revisit trigger below occurs, and in any case when the next stable policy version is adopted.

The Reference Application is a demonstration host. Its releases are tags and release notes over source; they do not ship binaries, archives, packages, or published container images. Sigstore keyless signing is therefore not implemented, because there are no consumer-facing release bytes to sign. Creating an archive only so that it can be signed would add a distribution channel nobody uses, plus its own trust and maintenance surface, without protecting any real download path.

This assessment covers artifact provenance only. It does not change runtime governance: decision-record hashing, mutation-audit manifests, audit-completion receipts, capability-token signing, and governed execution are application evidence produced while the host runs, and they are unrelated to how a release is distributed.

Inventory

Distribution path What a consumer receives Versioned, immutable release bytes?
GitHub releases (v0.1.0-alpha.1 … v1.0.1, 14 releases) Release notes only. Every release has zero attached assets (checked with gh release view <tag> --json assets). No
GitHub auto-generated source archives (.zip/.tar.gz on each release page) A snapshot of the tagged tree, generated by GitHub on request. Not uploaded by any workflow; not stated byte-stable by GitHub. No attached asset; the source is the tag itself
Git tags (vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH) The source of record, cloned and built by the consumer. Source, addressed by commit SHA
Container images Built locally by consumers from the repository Dockerfile (docker compose build). CI builds images only for smoke and upgrade tests and never pushes to a registry. Compose files reference local image names only. No published image
NuGet packages None. The projects are a host application, not libraries; no workflow packs or publishes them. AsiBackbone and NCAT packages are consumed, and their signing belongs to those repositories (AsiBackbone #933, NCAT #698). No
GitHub Actions artifacts Coverage reports (14 days), benchmark results (30 days), OWASP and Scorecard reports (5 days). Diagnostic outputs of CI runs, expiring by design, not offered as downloads. No
Documentation site (GitHub Pages) Rendered documentation, redeployed from main. Mutable, not versioned. No

Conclusion: the tags and GitHub's on-demand source archives are the only distributables, and no workflow publishes release bytes.

Threat model

Concern Today Would Sigstore signing of a release asset add value?
Source-to-build provenance Consumers build from a tag they clone. Provenance is the Git history plus hosted CI evidence for the exact commit, recorded under the Stable Release Policy v1. No. There is no prebuilt output whose origin is in doubt. Signing an archive would only attest to bytes that the consumer rebuilds from source anyway.
Trusted publishing identity Releases are created by maintainers from protected main; the ruleset, required checks, CodeQL, zizmor and actionlint protect the workflows. No workflow holds publish credentials for a registry or package feed. No. A keyless identity proves which workflow produced bytes; no workflow produces release bytes.
Tampering in transit Consumers fetch over authenticated HTTPS from GitHub and can pin the commit SHA. Marginal. A signature over a GitHub-generated archive cannot be produced by the repository for the exact bytes GitHub serves, so it would not cover the real download path.
Artifact retention Actions artifacts expire (5–30 days) and are not release evidence. Not applicable while nothing durable is published.
Tag integrity Stable tags are meant to be annotated and validated by scripts/Validate-StableRelease.ps1 -RequireStable. Finding: v1.0.1 was published as a lightweight tag; v1.0.0 is annotated. The policy forbids moving or rewriting a published tag, so v1.0.1 stays as it is and the release procedure gate applies to the next release. No. Tag-signing is a separate control from artifact signing and is outside this decision.

The main residual risk is that a consumer runs a binary that someone else built and redistributed. This repository does not offer one, so it cannot vouch for one; the documented path is to build from the tag.

Verifying a release today

These commands verify what the project actually distributes. They assume that GitHub's authentication of the repository and of the maintainers who create tags is trusted; they do not involve Sigstore.

# The release ships no attached assets, as this decision requires.
gh release view v1.0.1 --repo AsiBackbone/ReferenceApplication --json assets --jq '.assets | length'

# Fetch the exact tagged source and record the commit it resolves to.
git clone --branch v1.0.1 --depth 1 https://github.com/AsiBackbone/ReferenceApplication.git
git -C ReferenceApplication rev-parse 'HEAD^{commit}'

# Build the images locally from that source.
docker compose -f ReferenceApplication/docker-compose.yml build

Compare the commit SHA with the hosted CI evidence recorded for the release under the stable release policy.

Fail-closed guard

scripts/Test-ReleaseArtifactSigning.ps1 keeps this decision honest:

./scripts/Test-ReleaseArtifactSigning.ps1 -Tag vX.Y.Z
  • It reads the **Decision:** line above and fails if it is missing.
  • While the decision is Deferred, it fails if the published release has any attached asset, including a *.sigstore.json bundle, so assets cannot be published under a deferral that no longer applies.
  • It fails if it cannot read the release, and it fails for any other decision value until the script is extended to verify each bundle against the pinned workflow identity.
  • -SelfTest exercises every pass and fail path offline, including a tampered/unexpected-asset case. CI runs the self-test on every build.

The stable release procedure runs the check after publishing a release.

Revisit triggers

Implement signing, rather than extend this deferral, when any of these happens:

  1. a workflow or maintainer attaches any file to a GitHub release (archive, binary, SBOM, bundle, or migration bundle);
  2. a container image is pushed to a registry (for example GHCR) for consumers to pull;
  3. a NuGet package, dotnet tool, or other installable package is published from this repository;
  4. documentation tells consumers to download a prebuilt output instead of building from a tag; or
  5. the organization adopts a policy requiring signed provenance for every release, including source-only releases.

If signing is implemented, it must follow the organization pattern (AsiBackbone #933, NCAT #698): a protected, tag-triggered workflow with SHA-pinned actions and only id-token: write plus the minimum content permission; keyless Cosign signing of the exact published bytes; a durable <asset>.sigstore.json bundle attached to the release next to each asset so evidence outlives Actions artifact retention; verification with cosign verify-blob --bundle against the pinned certificate identity (https://github.com/AsiBackbone/ReferenceApplication/.github/workflows/<workflow>.yml@refs/tags/vX.Y.Z) and issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com; and an extension of scripts/Test-ReleaseArtifactSigning.ps1 that fails on a missing, orphaned, or mismatched bundle or an unexpected identity before the decision line changes to Implemented.