Release Artifact Signing Assessment
Decision: Deferred
Assessed: 2026-11-12, against releases v0.1.0-alpha.1 through v1.0.1 (#129).
Revisit: when any revisit trigger below occurs, and in any case when the next stable policy version is adopted.
The Reference Application is a demonstration host. Its releases are tags and release notes over source; they do not ship binaries, archives, packages, or published container images. Sigstore keyless signing is therefore not implemented, because there are no consumer-facing release bytes to sign. Creating an archive only so that it can be signed would add a distribution channel nobody uses, plus its own trust and maintenance surface, without protecting any real download path.
This assessment covers artifact provenance only. It does not change runtime governance: decision-record hashing, mutation-audit manifests, audit-completion receipts, capability-token signing, and governed execution are application evidence produced while the host runs, and they are unrelated to how a release is distributed.
Inventory
| Distribution path | What a consumer receives | Versioned, immutable release bytes? |
|---|---|---|
GitHub releases (v0.1.0-alpha.1 … v1.0.1, 14 releases) |
Release notes only. Every release has zero attached assets (checked with gh release view <tag> --json assets). |
No |
GitHub auto-generated source archives (.zip/.tar.gz on each release page) |
A snapshot of the tagged tree, generated by GitHub on request. Not uploaded by any workflow; not stated byte-stable by GitHub. | No attached asset; the source is the tag itself |
Git tags (vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH) |
The source of record, cloned and built by the consumer. | Source, addressed by commit SHA |
| Container images | Built locally by consumers from the repository Dockerfile (docker compose build). CI builds images only for smoke and upgrade tests and never pushes to a registry. Compose files reference local image names only. |
No published image |
| NuGet packages | None. The projects are a host application, not libraries; no workflow packs or publishes them. AsiBackbone and NCAT packages are consumed, and their signing belongs to those repositories (AsiBackbone #933, NCAT #698). | No |
| GitHub Actions artifacts | Coverage reports (14 days), benchmark results (30 days), OWASP and Scorecard reports (5 days). Diagnostic outputs of CI runs, expiring by design, not offered as downloads. | No |
| Documentation site (GitHub Pages) | Rendered documentation, redeployed from main. Mutable, not versioned. |
No |
Conclusion: the tags and GitHub's on-demand source archives are the only distributables, and no workflow publishes release bytes.
Threat model
| Concern | Today | Would Sigstore signing of a release asset add value? |
|---|---|---|
| Source-to-build provenance | Consumers build from a tag they clone. Provenance is the Git history plus hosted CI evidence for the exact commit, recorded under the Stable Release Policy v1. | No. There is no prebuilt output whose origin is in doubt. Signing an archive would only attest to bytes that the consumer rebuilds from source anyway. |
| Trusted publishing identity | Releases are created by maintainers from protected main; the ruleset, required checks, CodeQL, zizmor and actionlint protect the workflows. No workflow holds publish credentials for a registry or package feed. |
No. A keyless identity proves which workflow produced bytes; no workflow produces release bytes. |
| Tampering in transit | Consumers fetch over authenticated HTTPS from GitHub and can pin the commit SHA. | Marginal. A signature over a GitHub-generated archive cannot be produced by the repository for the exact bytes GitHub serves, so it would not cover the real download path. |
| Artifact retention | Actions artifacts expire (5–30 days) and are not release evidence. | Not applicable while nothing durable is published. |
| Tag integrity | Stable tags are meant to be annotated and validated by scripts/Validate-StableRelease.ps1 -RequireStable. Finding: v1.0.1 was published as a lightweight tag; v1.0.0 is annotated. The policy forbids moving or rewriting a published tag, so v1.0.1 stays as it is and the release procedure gate applies to the next release. |
No. Tag-signing is a separate control from artifact signing and is outside this decision. |
The main residual risk is that a consumer runs a binary that someone else built and redistributed. This repository does not offer one, so it cannot vouch for one; the documented path is to build from the tag.
Verifying a release today
These commands verify what the project actually distributes. They assume that GitHub's authentication of the repository and of the maintainers who create tags is trusted; they do not involve Sigstore.
# The release ships no attached assets, as this decision requires.
gh release view v1.0.1 --repo AsiBackbone/ReferenceApplication --json assets --jq '.assets | length'
# Fetch the exact tagged source and record the commit it resolves to.
git clone --branch v1.0.1 --depth 1 https://github.com/AsiBackbone/ReferenceApplication.git
git -C ReferenceApplication rev-parse 'HEAD^{commit}'
# Build the images locally from that source.
docker compose -f ReferenceApplication/docker-compose.yml build
Compare the commit SHA with the hosted CI evidence recorded for the release under the stable release policy.
Fail-closed guard
scripts/Test-ReleaseArtifactSigning.ps1 keeps this decision honest:
./scripts/Test-ReleaseArtifactSigning.ps1 -Tag vX.Y.Z
- It reads the
**Decision:**line above and fails if it is missing. - While the decision is
Deferred, it fails if the published release has any attached asset, including a*.sigstore.jsonbundle, so assets cannot be published under a deferral that no longer applies. - It fails if it cannot read the release, and it fails for any other decision value until the script is extended to verify each bundle against the pinned workflow identity.
-SelfTestexercises every pass and fail path offline, including a tampered/unexpected-asset case. CI runs the self-test on every build.
The stable release procedure runs the check after publishing a release.
Revisit triggers
Implement signing, rather than extend this deferral, when any of these happens:
- a workflow or maintainer attaches any file to a GitHub release (archive, binary, SBOM, bundle, or migration bundle);
- a container image is pushed to a registry (for example GHCR) for consumers to pull;
- a NuGet package,
dotnet tool, or other installable package is published from this repository; - documentation tells consumers to download a prebuilt output instead of building from a tag; or
- the organization adopts a policy requiring signed provenance for every release, including source-only releases.
If signing is implemented, it must follow the organization pattern (AsiBackbone #933, NCAT #698): a protected,
tag-triggered workflow with SHA-pinned actions and only id-token: write plus the minimum content permission;
keyless Cosign signing of the exact published bytes; a durable <asset>.sigstore.json bundle attached to the
release next to each asset so evidence outlives Actions artifact retention; verification with
cosign verify-blob --bundle against the pinned certificate identity
(https://github.com/AsiBackbone/ReferenceApplication/.github/workflows/<workflow>.yml@refs/tags/vX.Y.Z) and issuer
https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com; and an extension of scripts/Test-ReleaseArtifactSigning.ps1 that fails
on a missing, orphaned, or mismatched bundle or an unexpected identity before the decision line changes to
Implemented.