ADR-0005: Defer NuGet package signing with a mandatory review date
Status
Accepted on 2026-09-12. Review no later than 2027-03-31 or before the first 3.0.0 release candidate, whichever occurs first.
Decision owner: @cdcavell, repository and package publishing owner.
Context
NetCoreApplicationTemplate publishes a NuGet template package and an OCI image. The OCI image is signed by digest with Cosign keyless signing, but that signature does not cover the NuGet package. NuGet Trusted Publishing authenticates the protected GitHub Actions workflow to NuGet.org; it is publisher authentication and is not an author signature embedded in the .nupkg.
The repository currently has one maintainer. Introducing NuGet author signing requires a project-controlled code-signing certificate, secure certificate custody, timestamping, rotation and revocation procedures, NuGet.org certificate registration, and a recovery path that does not depend on one person's workstation. Those operational controls are not yet in place.
SBOMs, Source Link metadata, release tags, hashes, and GitHub artifact attestations improve traceability but are separate trust signals. None is represented as a substitute for NuGet package signing.
Decision
Defer NuGet author signing for the NetCoreApplicationTemplate package until the review deadline or an earlier trigger below. Continue publishing only through the protected template-package-publish environment and NuGet Trusted Publishing.
For every new tagged release, publish durable evidence for the exact .nupkg: an SPDX SBOM, SHA-256 hash, source tag and commit, and GitHub build-provenance attestations. Attach the evidence to the GitHub Release and record it in release-evidence-manifest.json.
Keep the following controls explicitly separate:
- Cosign signs the published OCI image digest; that signature does not cover the package.
- A separate Cosign keyless blob signature covers the exact
.nupkgattached to the GitHub Release (see the amendment below); it is not a NuGet author signature. - NuGet Trusted Publishing authorizes the workflow to publish the package.
- GitHub artifact attestations bind workflow provenance to the package and evidence files.
- SBOMs, Source Link, release tags, and retained SHA-256 hashes support inspection and correlation.
- NuGet package author signing remains absent until this decision is replaced.
Re-evaluate this decision immediately if a consumer or registry requires signed packages, package ownership or maintainership expands, publication becomes fully automated, a relevant supply-chain incident occurs, or a practical project-controlled certificate service becomes available.
Adopting package signing requires a replacement ADR that identifies the certificate owner and storage boundary, timestamp authority, NuGet.org registration, workflow integration, rotation schedule, revocation and incident response, verification commands, and recovery ownership.
Consequences
Consumers can durably retrieve package identity, composition, hash, source commit, and provenance evidence from the corresponding GitHub Release. They must nevertheless accept the residual risk that the .nupkg has no NuGet author signature.
The review is time-bounded and owner-assigned instead of being an open-ended deferral. Release reviews must not describe Cosign, Trusted Publishing, provenance, or an SBOM as package signing.
The release workflows become coupled at the evidence-publication boundary: both protected publish jobs must finish so the unified release manifest can be assembled and verified.
Amendment: Sigstore signature for the GitHub Release package (2026-11-12)
Issue #698 extends the existing Cosign keyless signing to the template package. For releases after v2.11.9, the protected publish-template job signs the exact validated .nupkg with cosign sign-blob using its GitHub Actions OIDC identity, attaches the package and its *.sigstore.json bundle to the GitHub Release, and verifies the bundle against the exact publish-template-package.yml release-tag identity before NuGet publication.
This amendment does not adopt NuGet author signing and does not change the decision or review date above:
| Signal | Status | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
Sigstore blob signature for the .nupkg |
Adopted for releases after v2.11.9 |
The exact package bytes attached to the GitHub Release, bound to the protected release workflow identity |
| Cosign image signature | Adopted | The published OCI image digest only |
| NuGet Trusted Publishing | Adopted | Authorization of the workflow to publish to NuGet.org; no signature in the package |
| NuGet.org repository signature | Applied by NuGet.org | The bytes NuGet.org serves; not an NCAT signature |
| NuGet author signing | Deferred by this ADR | Would bind the package to a project-controlled certificate |
NuGet.org repository-signs packages on ingestion, so the Sigstore bundle does not verify the NuGet.org copy, and NuGet tooling does not evaluate the bundle during install. A consumer or registry that requires NuGet author-signed packages is not satisfied by the bundle. Signer identities, verification commands, trust roots, and failure behavior are documented in Container Release Publishing.
Alternatives Considered
- Sign immediately with a maintainer-controlled certificate. Rejected because durable certificate custody, rotation, revocation, timestamping, and recovery controls are not yet established.
- Treat NuGet Trusted Publishing as package signing. Rejected because it authenticates publication but does not place an author signature in the package.
- Rely only on temporary GitHub Actions artifacts. Rejected because their retention expires while published packages remain available.